This article, containing all the trappings of an international legal document, is very useful because it is a primary source and is the original covenant.  However, it is article 10, 12 and 16 which I find the most important out of the twenty-three articles.

Article 10 stipulates that “the Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity” of any of the members of the League. Mussolini violated this article by claiming that Ethiopia “had no right to an independent existence owing to the inherent chaos in its administration, its lack of governmental unity and its ‘barbarism’”. (Northedge, 223-224).  This is why article 16, which claimed that “should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15”, it would “ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League” (289).  The reality was that Italy was considered ipso facto(…)to have committed an act of war” against Ethiopia, yet it took so much time for action to be put into effect.  Why ?   What did all these articles mean if action was not there to back them up ?

I find this source which contains the actual text debates of the time to be paramount in my research because it reeks of the hypocrisy and prevarication which have been intimated by historians writing about this topic.  For example, Laval saying that “France will meet her obligations(...)the Covenant is an international law and we can neither infringe it nor allow it to be weakened.”  However, the reality was very much different : France, having colluded with Great Britain was in pursuit of its own interests and disregarded the appeal of Ethiopia which felt a “threat not only to its security but to its very existence as a nation”. This threat of war was “growing from hour to hour, and the Ethiopian  people {were} waiting in increasing distress of mind as the fatal moment approach{ed} (...)” (361). Unfortunately, France’s claim to meet the obligations of the League’s Covenant proved eventually to be a disingenuous remark.

I consider these text debates to be of great value because I believe that international conflicts often abound with a considerable amount of speculation concerning what politicians and statesmen said, yet with these actual minutes, one can read between the lines and hence, get a better picture of the situation at the time as well as the nuances of their statements.

This short article attempts to establish the roots of the League’s failure to effectively enforce sanctions.  However it tries to assess some of the difficulties it was faced with : “the absence of universality in the League’s membership, the need to obtain co-operation from non - Member States; the desirability of certain amendments (...); the need for strengthening machinery for pacific settlement of disputes (...)”(75). This is consequently arranged in order of prime importance : it seems furthermore that great emphasis is placed on the fact that certain states were unwilling “to apply sanctions against Italy in response to its aggression against Ethiopia” which was an indication that “states were most reluctant to honor the covenant” (76) in the first place.

 

I find Ferencz’s source to be of considerable help to me because it clearly explains the principal reasons why Italy was given the carte blanche to pursue its policy of aggression. It as much as suggests that it is this event which earmarked the death of the League: “ The epitaph of the League of Nations was written by events surrounding Italy’s war against Ethiopia” (69)

 

            This article has led me to believe that the League was actually attempting to do something about the state of affairs following Ethiopia’s complaint. Unfortunately, it turns out that it was rather Britain and France which were instrumental in reinforcing and consolidating Mussolini’s complacency of the political situation in abeyance, thus giving him free berth to attack Ethiopia in October 1935.

 

This is a very short source which is also of great value to my research.  There is  not much to say about this source except that it is, as the title suggests, a summary of the covenant.

Given that the covenant is very detailed and not all twenty-three articles are relevant to my area of research, this source helps me greatly because it synthesises succinctly what the main articles are about.

 

 

This source is of great value because it reinforces Baer’s conviction that the British and the French were playing double roles: “(…)both the British and the French governments pursued double policies : working with the League to maintain a public image while negotiating with Italy to bring about a resolution of the crisis(…)”(3). The author also believes that the Abyssinian crisis “represented the most brutal force between expectation and performance”(3) which therefore lends authenticity to the credibility of the sources I have found.

 

 

 

The impression I get reading this article is that everyone was out for personal interests and not the interest of the League. Great Britain and France were playing the game of double policies - trying to appease Mussolini by punishing him leniently - almost a contradiction in terms.

 

Mussolini did not care much about violating article 16 of the Covenant; he was only out for war, contends the author: “(…) he had declared in December 1934…the destruction of the Abyssinian armed forces and the total conquest of Ethiopia”(285). Unfortunately, according to Baer, “He was confident of victory. He dismissed the anxieties of his general staff opposition(…)He certainly did not care what happened to the Covenant’s norms of international conduct”. He maintains that “To him, they were a conservative ideology meant to serve the haves (…)”(287).

 

Baer believes that the reason why “military sanctions against Italy were never considered”(288) was because all “conservative governments, and the Pope, feared that if Mussolini fell, bolshevism {sic} would sweep the peninsula”(288).

 

So much for the Wilsonian dream of open diplomacy.

 

 

 

As far as details go, this particular source is not detailed at all. It gives a basic scope of the League - albeit it’s history - which the author describes as “an agency for handling affairs of common concern to all nations"(42). I think this is too simplistic a definition of what the League was. However, his outline does discuss the fact that it had a couple of successes - namely “differences over the Aaland Islands in the Gulf of Bothria between Finland and Sweden…The Corfu disputes over Vilna, Memel, Upper Silesia, Albania, Ohaco and Leticia” all of which, according to the author, “ were arbitrated with more or less success”(43).

 

            The only reference which I might consider to be of importance is so only in the sense that it reinforces my conviction that the Abyssinian fiasco was actually instrumental in the League’s failure: “while settling relatively minor differences, the League failed to deal effectively with such major disputes as those arising over Japan’s in Manchuria in 1931, the Italo-Ethiopian War, and the Spanish Civil War”(43).

 

 

I was at first very reluctant to read this book in its entirety, but I eventually read it  and have not regretted having done so. Although the title may initially lead one to believe that it is way out of my topic of research, I believe it is not.

 

Harold Nicolson traces - as the title states - the evolution of diplomacy from the Greeks to the Italians to the French and finally to what he considered to be “the transition between the old diplomacy and the new”- that is the method employed by Americans in diplomacy , which he writes about in the last chapter.

 

            The essence of the book has actually changed my partial viewpoint because, since I started researching this topic, I have constantly pointed the finger of blame to the political lassitude of France and Britain  during the Abyssinian fiasco as having been instrumental in the downfall of the League. However, this book has made me aware of the complexities that are part and parcel of diplomacy - the need to appease one nation (as Britain was trying to do with Italy) and sacrifice the survival of a small state over what could have been a potentially serious crisis : the emergence of Germany and Italy as a powerful coalition.

 

This is one of the most comprehensive sources I have come across,  owing to the fact that Northedge tries to shed some light on what is a very complex area of research.

I find it interesting that he calls this chapter of thirty-four pages, “The Abyssinian Disaster” whereas all the other authors call it - to name but a few -  “the Italo-Ethiopian dispute of 1935-1936” (Larus, Joel. From Collective Security to Preventive Diplomacy : Readings in International Organization and the Maintenance of Peace.  John Wiley & Sons, INC, New York, London, Sydney. 1965) ; “the Italo-Ethiopian War” (Larus)”; “Italian Aggression” (Watson, Jack. Success in Twentieth Century World Affairs - Third Edition. John Murray (Publishers)Ltd. 1974, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1984.  pp 141).

After all, Italy was not the only country to have violated the League’s Covenant; Japan too did so in 1933, yet Northedge, in discussing Japan writes under the chapter “Manchuria : the covenant defied”.  In the foreword of the book, a certain Geoffrey Goodwin asserts that “Abyssinia was(...)as Northedge rightly claims, the decisive test for the League’s system(...)” (Northedge, viii).

This source is of great value because despite the serious questions which Northedge tries to pose, (“How could Britain, the world’s most powerful country at the time, together with France, second only to Britain in the scale of importance in world affairs, be worsted and humiliated by Italy, which suffered almost total defeat in the First World War and fared even worse in the second ?”(246) )  he eventually maintains an objective view that  “Britain was fighting, not on behalf of any unilateral national interest, but on behalf of universal interest, namely collective security”(246).

In the final analysis, Northedge presents the argument from both sides as much as possible, trying not to lay the blame solely on France and Great Britain, but also on “human weakness, failure of the nerve, the temptations of duplicity(...)and other faults”(252). 

There is an illustration on p.143 of this book - apparently from the magazine Punch - showing Mussolini in military uniform carrying a placard with the words “Abyssinian Dispute”. To his left stand two very casually dressed people - a man and a woman. The former is ostensibly from England and the latter from France and both are wagging their finger at Mussolini and claiming : “We don’t want you to fight but, by jingo, if you do, we shall probably issue a joint memorandum suggesting a mild disapproval of you”.   Above these words are the capitalised words : “THE AWFUL WARNING”.

  Apparently, this cartoon is from the magazine “Punch” and is a “comment on how France and Britain responded to Mussolini’s aggression in Ethiopia (…)Hardly surprising, Mussolini was unmoved”(143).

If it is true that a picture paints a thousand words, this illustration tells me so much : the Duce, turning away from the wagging fingers of France and England, looking determined and recalcitrant, and France represented as a woman.  Why not a man also ?  Is this therefore an indication that France - the “weaker” (sex) of the two - only tailed behind England ?  Their position is also important because one sees the woman shorter than the bearded man (England) who seems to be about the same size as Mussolini.  No matter how tough the bearded man looks, he is wearing a three-piece suit whereas she is wearing clogs.  Perhaps, one can thus surmise that Britain was prepared to stand up to Mussolini - even if she was initially casual about it.  I do not find this surprising as propaganda though ; after all “Punch” is a British magazine.

As regards this actual source, it is useful, because Watson makes a firmer conviction than the other authors about the League’s conduct : “The Ethiopian war was a disaster for collective security through the League of Nations. The League had failed miserably, undermined by the feebleness of Britain and France(…)”(143).

 

As a secondary source, these few pages are very useful and important in providing a general background for the League’s existence. Although the whole book is about the work of the United Nations in general, the authors believe that “the most important twentieth-century embodiment of the nineteenth-century experience with international cooperation was the League of Nations”(10).

 

            Like other historians, the authors contend that “during the 1930s,...the lack of community, the limited membership of the League and the unwillingness to renounce war or to treat its use as an attack on all sapped its capacities.”(12). They also maintain that “The League responded to the aggression in 1935 with economic sanctions (...) but that did not prevent the conquest of a weak African country”(13). They believe also that it was after the Italo-Ethiopian incident that “the League no longer had much political significance”(13).

 

 

The author gives a very comprehensive look at the League of Nations and writes about the League’s founding; its “Essential Features” and “Successes and Failures”.

 

            Owing to the fact that the author spends a considerable amount of time writing about the United Nations, he provides a very intensive account of the League so as to put it into relative perspective of the United Nations. However, under the sub-heading “successes and failures...”, the author explains in depth how “The League Council hesitated to take effective action since Great Britain and France were unwilling to apply economic or military sanctions (...)”(26). In fact, the author maintains also that it was perhaps “Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia” that posed “the greatest challenge to the League’s political effectiveness”(27).

 

 

At first, Gibbons and Morican’s account of the League of Nations may appear to be too simplistic for a university student to use; I do not think so. Simple it may be, but I find that it highlights the things that must be known about the League and explains the failures and successes by employing a considerable number of sources - both primary and secondary - in order for a reader to get a better perspective of the situation.

 

            For example, on page 63, there is a drawing of what is ostensibly a peaceful and tranquil life in an Ethiopian village : trees around huts and a baby crawling towards her mother. Underneath this drawing is the word ‘Barbarism’. To the right of this picture is the picture of a completely deserted area which looks like the village on the left. In the picture, one can see a plane flying above the deserted village  and beneath this illustration is the word “Civilisation”. Anyone who looks at this picture will immediately get the message of the illustrator - who most probably was a potential supporter of article 16, or who saw the invasion as a blatant aggression of a peaceful people who did not pose any real threat - if threat they were at all - except to the Italians.

 

 

Like a considerable number of historians, Wood makes the same contention that it was the invasion of Ethiopia by Italy which decisively marked the fall of the League: “ The principal factor in the undermining of the policy of collective security, however, was Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935”(407).

            It is of value because it helps consolidate my knowledge concerning this topic; besides, Wood also makes some strong assertions: “Neither Great Britain nor France was charitably disposed towards the idea of Italian control over Abyssinia - Great Britain, because she did not wish the sources of the Nile , fundamental to Egyptian economy to fall into their hands; France, because of her own economic interests there.”(408).

 

 

In fact , this whole book is very important for my research, because the author provides an in-depth analysis of each particular period - from sanctions to the Hoare-Laval proposals to the actual war and to the “Double policies” as he calls them, of both Britain and France.

 

            I chose not to read the whole book but rather cross-reference it with other sources - especially since it gives an intensive view of Britain and France’s stance.

 

            According to Baer, the British truly believed that the Ethiopians “were innocent defenders of their homeland” and that - to put it mildly - the Italians were in the wrong. Hoare was even to make what was ostensibly an electrifying speech on 11 September 1935 purporting  to be an ardent advocate of the League and collective security: “if risks for peace are to be run, they must be run by all. The security of the many cannot be ensured solely by the efforts of a few”(47). Yet apparently “this speech was a bluff”(47) for it was only delivered for the purpose of rallying support for a sentiment which seemed to be sweeping the nation - and hence provided fertile ground for an election issue.

However, Baer believes that the Italo-Ethiopian war was not really a major concern to the French. After all, they had other problems - like the future of the French Franc - to contend with: “ Laval became premier in June 1935 and served also as foreign minister(…) Laval…took power to arrest the deteriorating financial situation. His parliamentary mandate was to save the overvalued franc. During the summer and autumn of 1935, his major preoccupation was thus domestic finance, not Italy or Ethiopia” (53). A strong assertion for Baer to make; this idea would thus lend credence to the reason why the French bought time for so long before acting.

 

 

Joseph Avenol is an extremely important person whose name does not even appear in the 1988 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica!

 

            Although this source was incomplete (due to circumstances beyond my control and LLN University technicalities), I find it extremely useful with respect to my area of research. I have learnt how important Avenol was in the fate of the League and how much power he wielded in his post as Secretary-General of the League: “ As far back as April, 1933, shortly before Avenol became Secretary-General, …Aloisi, the Italian delegate to the League, wrote in his journal that he believed Avenol to be ‘a supporter of a French-Italian rapprochement’(…)The Secretary-General was clearly more interested in the private negotiations…”(125).

 

It appears from this article that Britain and France were not the only ones which equivocated; Avenol did so too :” From the inception of the conflict, however, Avenol seemed to do his best to avoid Covenant obligations, both in the interests of French foreign policy as he perceived them, and from the personal conviction that military conquest of an African nation was insufficient reason to insist upon enforcement of the League constitution”(125). This political detachment surprises me greatly and has consequently paved another way for me to ascertain to what extent Great Britain and France were solely to blame for the crisis of October 1935.

 

Lessons I have learned from historical research and bibliographical construction

 

This exercise has taught me a lot about bibliographical construction : how it is formed and how to write it. Initially, I felt that the MLA method was annoying and time-consuming. Rather, I realise that it actually saves time because it facilitates identifying the name of the authors. Furthermore, the title and year - which are extremely important  in locating any work of an author - is easier to see and considerably neater too.

 

            As regards historical research, I have gained a better insight into how to summarise sources of considerable length that I use. Finding a source however, is time-consuming because sometimes one which you consider to be paramount in your research cannot be located anywhere else.

 

            For example, I came across the source “Sword in arms”, which contained what I consider to be very important information regarding the failure of the League - the fact that the very first Secretary-General of the League, Sir Eric Drummond’s successor, Joseph Avenol - a French conservative administrator and former Deputy Secretary-General of the League - viewed the Italo-Ethiopian crisis with a great deal of detachment. However, the only other source that I was able to find about Avenol, was in Baer’s  “Test Case: Ethiopia, Italy and the League of Nations”. I checked the VUB library, the ULB library, the Encyclopaedia Brittanica, the Grolier Multimedia Encyclopaedia (v6.0), the Larousse Encyclopaedia, all to no avail. There was nothing about Sir Eric Drummond,  let alone Avenol. Why? Is it because the League failed or because they are not important enough?

 

            The conclusion I can therefore draw from this exercise with respect to historical research is that it has helped me understand the gist of a particular source and enabled me to trim it down with a critical eye by seeing what each source is stating or inferring. The problem I found though is that sometimes the important people,  like Joseph Avenol , cannot be traced down easily enough,  if at all.

 

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